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Six Principles for Integrating NonGovernmental Environmental
Standards into Smart Regulation
STEPAN WOOD * & LYNN JOHANNSON **
Ontario recently introduced environmental penalties (EPs), the environmental equivalent of
speeding tickets. EPs are widely understood as part of a move toward “smarter”
environmental regulation. As part of the EPs regime, facilities with an environmental
management system aligned with ISO 14001 or Responsible Care qualify for reduced
penalties. The Ontario government’s attempt to incorporate voluntary standards—such as
ISO 14001—into its EPs regulations was not very smart, however, because it failed to
observe six principles that, in our view, should guide the incorporation of standards into
smart regulation. First, do not reinvent the wheel. If an existing standard fulfills the
objectives of a proposed regulation, and was developed by a recognized standards body
through a multi-stakeholder consensus process, it would be “smart” to incorporate the
standard into the regulatory scheme as far as possible and appropriate, rather than
drafting a new standard from scratch. Second, avoid unexplained discrepancies between
the regulation and the standard. Third, if an existing, widely accepted standard does not, on
its own, meet all of the public policy goals of the proposed regulation, indicate clearly how
the standard is deficient and what more is required to meet public policy objectives. Fourth,
consult relevant standardization bodies when developing regulations; they are experts on
the topic. Fifth, participate in standardization processes in order to keep abreast of
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developments and influence the content of the standards. Finally, where both regulators
and standards development bodies have failed to take into account the special
characteristics and challenges of small businesses, they must now address these
important factors. A critical period for small business and sustainability is about to unfold.
L’Ontario a récemment instauré des pénalités environnementales (PE) qui sont un
équivalent environnemental des contraventions pour excès de vitesse. Ces pénalités
environnementales sont largement considérées dans le cadre d’une tendance orientée
vers une réglementation environnementale plus « futée ». Dans le régime des pénalités
environnementales, les établissements qui appliquent la norme ISO 14001 du système de
gestion environnementale ont droit à des pénalités réduites. La tentative du gouvernement
de l’Ontario d’incorporer des normes volontaires telles la norme ISO 14001 à ses
règlements de pénalités environnementales n’était pas très judicieuse, étant donné que
cette tentative ne se conformait pas aux six principes qui, à notre avis, devraient orienter
l’intégration des normes à une réglementation intelligente. Premièrement, ne réinventez
pas la roue. Si une norme existe et qu’elle répond aux objectifs de la réglementation
proposée, et si elle a été élaborée selon un ensemble de normes reconnues par le biais
d’un processus aux intervenants multiples ayant fait l’objet d’un consensus veuillez, dans
la mesure du possible, intégrer cette norme à un projet réglementaire approprié, au lieu
d’en rédiger une nouvelle à partir de zéro. Deuxièmement, évitez des écarts inexpliqués
entre la réglementation et la norme. Troisièmement, si une norme existante qui est
largement acceptée ne répond pas par elle-même à tous les objectifs des politiques
publiques de la réglementation proposée, indiquez clairement en quoi elle est insuffisante
et ce qui est nécessaire afin de satisfaire aux objectifs en matière de politique publique.
Quatrièmement, consultez les organismes de réglementation pertinents lors de
l’élaboration de règlements; ils sont des experts en la matière. Cinquièmement, participez
à la normalisation afin de rester au courant des développements et de l’incidence de la
teneur des normes. Enfin, les organismes de réglementation et d’élaboration des normes
doivent maintenant tenir compte des caractéristiques et des défis spécifiques des petites
entreprises. Une période cruciale pour les petites entreprises et la durabilité est sur le
point de survenir.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

IN JUNE 2007, the government of Ontario, Canada, released its long-awaited

Environmental Penalties (EPs) regulations.1 EPs are financial penalties that may
be imposed by enforcement officials upon discovery of an alleged
environmental violation, without having to prove the elements of an offence in
court. In developing these regulations, the Ontario government made a clumsy
effort to incorporate environmental management systems (EMSs) and nongovernmental EMS standards into the regulatory scheme. The regulations offer
a small reduction in the amount of an EP if the violator had an environmental
management system in place at the time of the contravention that met the
requirements of the International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO’s)
ISO 14001 standard2 or the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program.3 An
EMS is a set of management processes and procedures that allows an
organization to identify, plan for, and manage the environmental aspects of its
activities, products, and services. The introduction of EPs and the penalty
reduction for EMSs were both part of an attempt to make Ontario
environmental regulation “smarter” by giving regulators a wider range of
enforcement options and encouraging regulated entities to adopt reflexive selfmanagement measures. “Smart regulation” has been described as “a far more
imaginative, flexible, and pluralistic approach to environmental regulation than

1.

2.

3.

Environmental Penalties, O. Reg. 222/07 (enabling statute: Environmental Protection Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19) [Final EPs Regulation]; Environmental Penalties, O. Reg. 223/07
(enabling statute: Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.40). See also Ontario
Ministry of the Environment, Guideline for Implementing Environmental Penalties (Ontario
Regulations 222/07 and 223/07) (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2007), online:
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/en/about/penalties/EPguidelines.pdf>.
Canadian Standards Association, National Standard of Canada CAN/CSA-ISO 14001:04
(ISO 14001:2004), Environmental management systems – Requirements with guidance for use
(Mississauga: CSA, 2004) [ISO 14001:2004].
The Responsible Care program was initiated by the Canadian chemical industry in 1985 and
is now a global initiative of the International Council of Chemical Associations. See
Responsible Care, online: <http://www.responsiblecare.org>.
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has so far been adopted in most jurisdictions.”4 It seeks to avoid “the excesses
and inefficiencies of stand alone command and control regulation on the one
hand and the pitfalls of deregulation on the other” by employing multiple
policy instruments and regulatory actors in complementary, context-specific
combinations.5 The goal of this article is to show that the government’s effort
to incorporate EMSs into its regime of environmental regulation was not, in
fact, smart. Based on the lessons learned in this case study, we propose six guiding
principles for how to incorporate non-governmental standards into regulation.
The article proceeds as follows. In this part, we provide an overview of our
main argument. In Part II, we define standards, environmental management
systems, environmental penalties, and smart regulation, while providing some
context for the issues addressed in this article. We then present our six
principles in Part III, and offer some concluding observations in Part IV.
Ontario’s draft regulation caused a stir in the global standards community,
even though the penalty reduction for EMSs is a minor feature of the
environmental penalties scheme and applies in just one of ten Canadian
provinces. What alarmed the international EMS community was not that the
government would offer a penalty reduction for EMS adoption. This was
generally welcomed. It was how the government proposed to incorporate EMSs
into the regulatory system that caused concern.
Instead of integrating the leading, globally-recognized EMS standard ISO
14001 into its EPs regulations, the government effectively wrote its own
detailed EMS standard from scratch. While the government’s proposed EMS
model was broadly similar to ISO 14001, it was full of idiosyncratic
terminology, concepts, and requirements. Implementation of the regulatory
EMS would have created uncertainty and additional expense for businesses,
auditors, and the government, in return for unclear public policy benefits.
Moreover, at no point in the preparation of the draft EPs regulations did the
government consult with the established, multi-stakeholder national
committee 6 responsible for negotiating international EMS standards and
adopting them as national standards for Canada. It was only after the draft

5.

See e.g. Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky & Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing
Environmental Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at 4.
Ibid. at 35.

6.

For a description of this committee, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.

4.
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regulations were released for public comment that the committee learned of the
proposed regulatory EMS and requested a meeting with the government.
Ultimately, the Ontario government heeded the concerns of the EMS
standards community and incorporated most of the national committee’s
suggestions into the final EPs regulations. The government’s main response to
the concerns was simply to delete its homegrown EMS. Instead, the regulations
simply stated that to qualify for the EP reduction, a facility’s EMS had to
conform to either ISO 14001 or the chemical industry’s Responsible Care
program. This eliminated the risk of uncertainty and extra cost for regulated
firms. However, it also represented a lost opportunity to engage in a serious
public conversation about what ISO 14001 can contribute to the achievement
of public policy goals, what magnitude of regulatory incentive it should merit,
and what additional steps beyond conformity to ISO 14001, if any, should be
expected from regulated entities in exchange for more favourable regulatory
treatment. These questions have been raised in various fora since before ISO
14001 was first published in 1996. Serious public policy deliberation in Canada
on this issue is long overdue.
As a result, Ontario’s EPs regulations and the process by which they were
developed provide an object lesson in how not to approach the relationship
between standards and government regulation. On the basis of this
cautionary tale, we propose six principles to guide the incorporation of
standards into regulation:
Principle 1: Do Not Reinvent the Wheel
If a recognized standards development body has gone to the trouble of
developing a widely accepted standard that fulfills the objectives of a
proposed regulation, incorporate the existing standard into the regulatory
scheme as far as possible and appropriate, instead of drafting a new
specification from scratch.
Principle 2: Strive for Consistency
If a widely accepted standard already exists on the subject, do not create a
host of unexplained inconsistencies between the proposed regulation and
the standard.
Principle 3: Make Any Extra Requirements Clear
If an existing, widely accepted standard does not, on its own, meet all
the public policy goals of the proposed regulation, identify clearly how
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the standard is deficient and what more is required to meet public
policy objectives.
Principle 4: Connect with the Experts
Consult relevant multi-stakeholder standards development committees
when developing regulations.
Principle 5: Get Involved with Standards Development
Participate in the work of relevant standards development committees to
keep abreast of relevant issues and influence the content of standards on an
ongoing basis.
Principle 6: Consider the Needs of Small Business
Design regulations in a way that addresses the special characteristics and
challenges of the small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that represent
around 98 per cent7 of the business community.
While the immediate focus of our analysis is environmental regulation, the
implications extend well beyond the subject of EPs and EMSs to embrace broader
questions about what constitutes smart regulation, what role standardization
should play in smart regulation, and what role standards and smart regulation
should play in meeting the challenge of a sustainable future for Canada.
The first five of our proposed principles contemplate minor, incremental
reforms to the regulatory process. The sixth poses a fundamental challenge. We
cannot answer these questions about standards, smart regulation, and
sustainable development adequately without recognizing the unique
characteristics and challenges of small business.8 We see small business as the
sleeping giant in the sustainability story. This giant is about to turn over and
shake the foundation of our economy.
Environmental regulation, for all its successes, has proven inept at solving
environmental problems and promoting environmental sustainability with
respect to small business. Ontario’s EPs regulations are but one example of this

7.
8.

Industry Canada, “Key Small Business Statistics” (January 2008), online: <http://www.
strategis.gc.ca/sbstatistics>.
SMEs are defined differently in different jurisdictions and for different purposes. They are
often defined in terms of number of employees or total revenue. The line between SMEs and
large enterprises is typically drawn somewhere between 100 and 500 employees. See e.g.
Ruth Hillary, “Introduction” in Ruth Hillary, ed., Small and Medium Sized Enterprises and
the Environment (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2000) 11 at 13.
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problem. To be fair, ISO and national standards bodies have done no better
than governments at responding to the sustainability challenges of small
business. This article is a wake-up call to both governments and standardization
bodies to find new ways to engage with small business—and quickly.
Unfolding environmental crises, such as climate change and chemical
management, along with impending demographic shifts associated with the
aging of the baby boom generation, mean that Canada and other countries are
about to enter a period of turmoil that will truly test their understanding of—
and ability to evolve toward—sustainability.
II. STANDARDS, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS,
ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES, AND SMART REGULATION
A.

STANDARDS

In this article, we use the term “standard” as it is used in the world of formal
standardization. A standard is a “[d]ocument, established by consensus and
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use,
rules, guidelines, or characteristics for activities or results, aimed at the
achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given context.”9 Standards
may relate to nomenclature, measurement, design, function, performance,
safety, consistency, ingredients, or any number of other attributes of materials,
products, or the processes by which they are produced. They may relate to the
inter-operability or compatibility of different products. They may also, as in the
case of EMS standards, relate to the generic management frameworks and
processes employed by organizations.
In theory, three things set standards apart from government regulation.
First, they are voluntary rather than mandatory. Second, they are established by
consensus among interested and affected private, public, and voluntary sector
representatives. Third, they are developed outside normal public policy
processes, in recognized standards development organizations. All three of these
characteristics raise difficult issues. We will return to the questions of
“consensus” and “recognized bodies” in Part III. The “voluntary versus
9.

Standards Council of Canada (SCC), CAN-P-1E, Accreditation of Standards Development
Organizations (Ottawa: SCC, 2006), s. 2.2 [CAN-P-1E], online: <http://www.scc.ca/en/
publications/criteria/all.shtml>, quoting ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004, Standardization and
Related Activities – General Vocabulary (Geneva: ISO/IEC, 2004), s. 3.2 [ISO/IEC Guide 2].
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mandatory” dichotomy is also problematic, but we do not subject it to serious
scrutiny in this article.10
Virtually every aspect of daily life is touched by standards. Standards relate
to everything from screw thread sizes and bicycle helmet design to internet
protocols and high definition television formats. In Canada alone there are
several thousand national standards “for everything from AC meters to
zirconium.”11 Worldwide, the number of national and international standards is
well into the millions. For all their pervasiveness, however, standards and
standardization bodies keep a remarkably low profile. You may have noticed
“ISO” speed ratings on photographic film cartridges, back when film cameras
were in widespread use. You may have seen a logo on consumer products
indicating conformity to a product standard (e.g., “UL” for Underwriters
Laboratories). You may even have been momentarily curious when passing a
highway billboard proclaiming an industrial facility’s implementation of “ISO
9001” or “ISO 14001”—the leading international standards for quality
management systems and environmental management systems, respectively.
This, however, is the extent of most people’s awareness of standards.
Over the years, lawmakers around the world have incorporated reams of
standards into official regulations. Hundreds of standards have been
incorporated by reference into current Canadian federal, provincial, and
municipal laws, from building and electrical codes, to product safety and
consumer protection standards, to technical standards for oil and gas pipelines,
as well as other hazardous undertakings. This phenomenon went largely
unnoticed by scholars of public administration and law until the 1990s,12 when
10. The standards versus regulations dichotomy, and the voluntary versus mandatory and private
versus public dichotomies that underpin it, tend to fall apart under close examination. See
e.g. Stepan Wood, “Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability,” in Benjamin J.
Richardson & Stepan Wood, eds., Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford: Hart,
2006) 229 at 248-249; Stepan Wood, “Three Questions About Corporate Codes:
Problematizations, Authorizations and the Public/Private Divide” in Wesley Cragg, ed.,
Ethics Codes, Corporations and the Challenge of Globalization (Cheltenham, UK: Edward
Elgar, 2005) 245. Nonetheless, these dichotomies remain central presuppositions within the
standardization community. See e.g. Alan O. Sykes, Product Standards for Internationally
Integrated Goods Markets (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1995) at 2.
11. Standards Council of Canada, “National Standards System,” online: <http://www.scc.ca/en/nss/>.
12. For a notable exception, see Robert W. Hamilton, “The Role of Nongovernmental
Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health”
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several developments conspired to raise the profile of non-governmental
standardization and stir up questions about its role in official regulation.
The first development was the movement by standardization bodies such as
the British Standards Institution (BSI), Canadian Standards Association (CSA),
and ISO into the field of “generic” management system standards. This trend
began with quality management system (QMS) standards in the 1980s, most
notably ISO 9001, first published by ISO in 1987.13 Standards bodies quickly
extended the management systems approach to environmental management
standards in the early 1990s, and have since applied it to subjects as diverse as
risk, supply chain, business ethics, food safety, occupational health and safety,
and road traffic management. This was uncharted territory for standardization
bodies. Unlike traditional technical standards that address the characteristics,
performance, or design of specific products, generic standards address broad
organizational management structures and processes. They are intended to
apply generically to organizations of any size, kind, or location, and in any
sector, whether public, private, or non-profit. Previously obscure standards
bodies were catapulted into the academic spotlight as they addressed issues with
increasingly obvious public policy stakes, such as environmental protection and
occupational health and safety.14
The second development was the European Community’s adoption in the
mid-1980s of its New Approach to product regulation, in which official
European legislation was limited to laying down essential requirements for safety,
health, or environmental protection. The elaboration of detailed requirements
and test methods was left to European standards bodies. Once a product
standard was published, manufacturers following it enjoyed a presumption of
compliance with the legislation.15 Suddenly, European national governments

(1978) 56 Texas L. Rev. 1329.
13. There are approximately 900,000 ISO 9001 certificates worldwide. International Organization
for Standardization, The ISO Survey of Certifications 2006 (Geneva: ISO, 2007) [ISO Survey].
14. See e.g. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Shifting the Point of Regulation: The International
Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment”
(1995) 22 Ecology L.Q. 479; Riva Krut & Harris Gleckman, ISO 14001: A Missed
Opportunity for Sustainable Global Industrial Development (London: Earthscan, 1998).
15. Henk de Vries, “Fundamentals of Standards and Standardization” in Wilfried Hesser, Albert
Feilzer & Henk de Vries, eds., Standardisation in Companies and Markets (Hamburg: Helmut
Schmidt University Press, 2006) 1 at 14.
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and consumer advocates found it necessary to focus greater attention on the
little-known machinations of European standards development.
A third development worth noting was the conclusion of the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
agreements of the World Trade Organization in 1994. These agreements
elevated international voluntary standards to the status of trade disciplines
against which the legality of government food safety and technical product
regulations would be judged.16 This development ignited controversy about
standards development processes and the content of international standards. It
also sparked competition among various fledgling transnational standardssetting organs for acknowledgement as “recognized” standardization bodies
alongside established contenders such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission,
International Telecommunications Union, International Electro-Technical
Commission (IEC), and ISO.
These developments conspired to shine a spotlight on standards and
standards development bodies, and prompted many observers to take a closer
look at environmental management systems and EMS standards.
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND EMS STANDARDS

An environmental management system, as we noted at the outset, is a set of
management processes and procedures that allows an organization to identify,
plan for, and manage the environmental aspects of its activities, products, and
16. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (14 April 1994) in WTO, The Legal Texts: The
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) 117, online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17tbt.pdf> [TBT Agreement]; Agreement on the Application Of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (14 April 1994) 69, online: <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps.pdf> [SPS Agreement]. The TBT Agreement, Art. 2.4, provides that member states must
use existing standards developed by international standardization bodies as a basis for their
technical regulations, unless the standards would be “an ineffective or inappropriate means
for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance, because of fundamental
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.” The SPS
Agreement, Art. 3, requires that member states must base their food safety and animal and
plant health regulations on international standards unless they can justify a higher level of
protection scientifically or as a consequence of consistent risk decisions based on an
appropriate risk assessment. Under both agreements, regulations that conform to
international standards are presumed to comply with international trade law. See e.g. TBT
Agreement, Art. 2.5.
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services. EMSs were an outgrowth of quality management systems (QMSs). By
the early 1990s, national and international standards development bodies had
begun to develop EMS standards to offer comparability across organizations,
sectors, and jurisdictions. In the run up to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (made up mainly of
leaders of large multinational corporations) called on ISO to coordinate this
effort as part of the business community’s contribution to the goal of
sustainable development. In 1996, ISO published ISO 14001, the first
international EMS standard. A second edition was published in 2004 after a
five-year revision process.
ISO is a federation of 157 national standards bodies from around the
world. It is the world’s largest developer of international standards. As of
December 2007, it had published more than 17,000 international standards
and guides, totalling more than 650,000 pages.17 ISO 14001 is one of ISO’s
flagship standards. It was developed and revised through a delicate, decade-long
international negotiation process. It has been adopted as a national standard in
Canada18 and more than 140 other countries,19 and has been incorporated into
the European Union’s voluntary Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS).20 As of January 2007, at least 129,000 ISO 14001 certificates had
been issued to public and private sector organizations in 142 countries.21 This is
only the tip of the iceberg, since there is no centralized registry of ISO
certificates and many organizations use ISO 14001 to implement or improve
their EMSs without pursuing formal certification.
17. International Organization for Standardization, ISO in Figures for the Year 2007 (Geneva:
ISO, 2008) at 2, online: <http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_in_figures.htm>.
18. ISO 14001:2004, supra note 2.
19. ISO Survey, supra note 13. The figure is approximate because national member bodies have
no obligation to report their adoption of ISO standards.
20. EC, Regulation (EC) No. 761/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March
2001 allowing voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and
audit scheme, [2001] O.J. L 114/1. See also European Commission, “EMAS – The EcoManagement and Audit Scheme,” online: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/
index_en.htm> [EMAS].
21. Reinhard Peglau, “Worldwide ISO 14001 Update January 2007” [unpublished report; copy
on file with authors]. The total number of firms with ISO 14001 certificates is likely much
lower than this because large organizations typically obtain certificates at the individual
facility level.
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An ISO 14001 EMS is based on a cyclical “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA)
approach. An organization Plans to do something. It Does it. It Checks the
results, and takes Action to correct problems, prevent recurrences, and improve
future results. This cycle makes an EMS a quintessentially reflexive tool.22 If
implemented in a robust and credible manner, EMSs stimulate organizations to
reflect upon and systematically manage their environmental aspects and
impacts. This can lead to continual improvement of their management system
and business risk, including their regulatory, financial, and environmental
performance. 23 EMSs can help organizations to internalize environmental
issues, including environmental legal requirements, into all decision making—
from high-level strategy to daily operations.
This article is not about the advantages or disadvantages of EMSs,
however. We take as given that the Ontario government, like numerous other
governments, believes that EMSs can offer some benefits in terms of
improved environmental or regulatory performance.24 Why else would it have
sought to provide incentives for EMS implementation? The question for this
article is how Ontario should have gone about incorporating EMSs into its
regulatory scheme.
C.

ENVIRONMENTAL PENALTIES

Ontario borrowed the idea of environmental penalties from the United States,
where similar tools have been available since the 1970s, usually under the name
“administrative penalties” (APs). APs were introduced to allow government
officials to issue relatively modest financial penalties for minor environmental
violations without incurring the time and expense of a full-blown investigation,
prosecution, and trial. Before APs, environmental law enforcement boiled

22. Eric W. Orts, “Reflexive Environmental Law” (1995) 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227.
23. See e.g. Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Systems: Do They Improve
Performance? National Database on Environmental Management Systems, Project Final Report,
vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2003) at 285-88; Aseem
Prakash & Matthew Potosky, The Voluntary Environmentalists (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); and Oren Perez, Yair A. Hamburger & Tammy Shterental,
“Environmental Commitment, Organizational Civic Behavior and Institutional Change: The
influence of ISO 14001” [unpublished manuscript, 2 July 2007; copy on file with authors].
24. For empirical evidence of the impacts of EMSs on environmental and regulatory
performance, see ibid.
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down to a choice between voluntary industry compliance or the blunt
instrument of criminal or quasi-criminal prosecution, with the latter reserved
only for the most egregious cases.25 Investigations and prosecutions would often
drag out for years before reaching a final conclusion. As a result, many
violations were not investigated or prosecuted at all.26
APs were one of several innovative enforcement tools introduced to get
away from this often unsatisfactory binary choice. APs do away with the need
for formal court proceedings altogether. In theory, this may reduce enforcement
costs for governments, regulated firms, and interested third parties alike, and
increase the level of enforcement of environmental laws.27 Research indicates
that APs have a credible deterrent effect at very modest administrative cost.28
For these reasons many governments embraced APs enthusiastically.
Regulated industries, on the other hand, dislike them. One concern is
absolute liability: the government may impose APs without proving the
elements of the offence. Another concern is double jeopardy: in some
jurisdictions, payment of an AP may not bar prosecution for the same offence.
Industry also objects to the relative lack of judicial scrutiny of AP determinations,
the high level of administrative discretion over some APs, and the one-size-fitsall approach of others. Some environmental non-governmental organizations
(ENGOs) have embraced APs, but others have condemned them as trivializing
what should properly be considered crimes.29 These concerns notwithstanding,
APs have proliferated in the US and have been introduced in several other
countries. They are one of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s favourite
enforcement tools, increasing dramatically in the last few years.30

25. David Boyd argues that this binary choice characterizes Canadian environmental law
generally. David Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian Environmental Law and Policy
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
26. Dianne Saxe, “Environmental penalty discount for ISO 14001:2004 users” ISO Management
Systems (March-April 2007) 38.
27. Carolyn Abbot, “Environmental Command Regulation” in Richardson & Wood, supra note
10, 61 at 94.
28. R.M. Brown, “Administrative and Criminal Penalties in the Enforcement of Occupational
Health and Safety Legislation” (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 691.
29. See Abbot, supra note 27 at 93.
30. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued over 4,600 final APs in the fiscal
year 2006 with a total value of US$42 million. This constituted, by far, the highest number
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Ontario first enacted legislation authorizing APs in 1998. The legislation
was never implemented. After a change of government and some high profile
spills from petrochemical facilities, a new provincial statute known as the “Spills
Bill” was enacted in 2005.31 Among other things, it reintroduced administrative
penalties under the name “environmental penalties.” The government’s message
to polluters was simple: “You spill, you pay.”32 In theory, EPs “would encourage
companies to make greater efforts to prevent spills” and provide “additional
incentives to clean them up quickly.”33 The purpose of EPs was to protect the
environment by encouraging companies to take steps, including
implementation of an EMS, to prevent environmental violations, remedy their
effects, and prevent their recurrence.
The provincial government engaged in a year-long process of public and
stakeholder consultations on regulations to implement the EPs scheme,
culminating with the posting of the proposed regulations and a detailed
guidance document for public comment in October 2006.34 Under the draft
regulations, only 148 large industrial facilities in nine sectors that discharge
contaminated effluent to a surface water course or private effluent treatment
plant would be subject to EPs. At first, EPs would only be available for
of final APs ever issued. US Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance and Enforcement
Annual Results: Numbers at a Glance, Fiscal Year 2006 (15 November 2006), online:
<http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2006/fy2006numbers.
pdf>; US Environmental Protection Agency, “National Enforcement Trends – FY 2005,”
online: <http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/nets.html>.
31. Bill 133, Environmental Enforcement Statute Law Amendment Act, 1st Sess., 38th Leg.,
Ontario, 2005 (assented to 13 June 2005), S.O. 2005, c. 12.
32. Ontario, Ministry of the Environment, News Release, “McGuinty Government Introduces
Environmental Penalties Legislation: You Spill You Pay Law Lays Out Tough Penalties and
Creates Community Cleanup Fund” (27 October 2004).
33. Ibid.
34. Draft Ontario Regulation made under the Environmental Protection Act – Environmental
Penalties [no date; copy on file with authors] [Draft EPs Regulation]; Draft Ontario
Regulation made under the Ontario Water Resources Act – Environmental Penalties [no date;
copy on file with authors]. See also Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Guideline for
Implementing Environmental Penalties, Draft (September 2006) [Draft EPs Guideline], online:
<http://www.ceaa-acve.ca/Guideline_for_Implementing_Environmental_Penalties.pdf>.
The operative provisions of the two draft regulations were essentially the same. For purposes
of discussion, this article refers to the draft regulation made under the Environmental
Protection Act.
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violations involving unlawful discharges to water or land. Other violations, such
as permitting, operating, sampling, reporting, and record-keeping
contraventions, would be phased in later.
The draft regulations specified procedures for initiating, calculating,
reviewing, settling, issuing, appealing, and paying EPs. They set the maximum
amount of EPs at $100,000 per violation, per day, and specified factors for
determining the amount of an EP. The amount would be determined by a
senior Ministry of the Environment official based on the gravity of the violation
and any monetary benefit acquired by the violator as a result of the violation.
The “gravity component” of an EP would be reduced by 5 per cent for
violators who could demonstrate that they had an EMS in place at the time of
the violation that met detailed requirements set out in a Schedule.35 The EMS
would have to be audited by an independent, external auditor and the violator
would have to submit a statement from the auditor certifying that the EMS
satisfied the requirements of the regulations.
Why all the fuss about such an apparently minor regulatory incentive? It
was clear to most observers that the 5 per cent reduction was insufficient on its
own to induce regulated facilities to implement an EMS in line with the
regulations. Furthermore, the EMS penalty reduction was small potatoes in the
public debate about the EPs scheme, which focused on double jeopardy and
absolute liability. The proposed EMS penalty reduction was controversial
principally because of what it said about the government’s view of the role of
standards in smart regulation.
D.

SMART REGULATION

“Smart regulation” is an umbrella term for efforts to forge a middle path
between the extremes of command regulation and deregulation.36 It aims to

35. Draft EPs Regulation, ibid., s. 17 and Sch. 1. Steps taken as part of an EMS (for example,
environmental policies and procedures, risk analyses, systems monitoring, operational
controls, employee training, and emergency preparedness and response systems) could also
be taken into account when determining what actions the violator took to prevent or
mitigate the violation, thereby further reducing the gravity component of the EP. The
amount of an EP could also be reduced for a good compliance history, preventive measures,
prompt remedial action, membership in a provincial environmental leadership program, or
investment in an approved “beyond compliance” environmental project.
36. See e.g. Richard B. Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?” (2001) 29
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make effective and efficient use of public resources. It promotes the use of a
sophisticated mix of regulatory instruments, from emission limits to taxes and
trading, and from corporate environmental covenants to disclosure
obligations and public participation rights. It emphasizes environmental
performance goals over the precise techniques used to achieve them. It
combines this with an emphasis on procedural tools, such as public
participation and environmental impact assessment, which are designed to
stimulate dialogue and reflection.37 It seeks to stimulate self-reflection and
self-correction by regulated actors in line with public goals, rather than by
dictating the details of permissible behaviour. It “attempts to create incentives
and procedures that induce entities to act in certain ways and to engage in
internal reflection about what form that behaviour should take. … The state
sets goals, but shares more of the responsibility for achieving them with
regulated entities.”38 Smart regulation strives for a subtle balance between
coercive and non-coercive regulatory techniques. It relies on education,
persuasion, rewards, and voluntary self-regulation where possible, and
escalates up the regulatory pyramid toward mandated self-regulation, coregulation, fines, and imprisonment when necessary.39
The smart regulation movement emerged in the 1990s as an effort to seek
middle ground between the conventional “command and control” model of
environmental regulation that prevailed in the 1970s and the excesses of
deregulation experienced in the 1980s.40 The “command and control” model of
Capital U.L. Rev. 21; Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Shades of
Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment (Stanford: Stanford Law and Politics, Stanford
University Press, 2003); and sources cited infra note 40.
37. See e.g. Julia Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation: Part I” (2000) 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud.
597; Julia Black, “Proceduralizing Regulation: Part II” (2001) 21 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 33;
and Julia Black, “Regulatory Conversations” (2002) 29 J.L. & Soc’y 163.
38. Daniel J. Fiorino, “Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and
Governance” (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441 at 447-48.
39. Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the DeregulationReregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). In recent years Braithwaite
has moderated his enthusiasm for reward-based approaches, pointing out the advantages of
punishment as a regulatory strategy. See e.g. John Braithwaite, “Rewards and Regulation”
(2002) 29 J.L. & Soc’y 12.
40. See e.g. Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, supra note 4; Ayres & Braithewaite, ibid.; and
Cass R. Sunstein, “Paradoxes of the Regulatory State” (1990) 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 407.
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environmental regulation is widely credited with having achieved substantial
improvements in a variety of first generation environmental problems. By the
early 1980s, however, it had come under increasing criticism for being
unresponsive to newer environmental problems, such as persistent toxic
substances, climate change, and biodiversity loss. It was also criticized as too
cumbersome, costly, rigid, adversarial, and slow. Critics warned that it was
nearing the limits of its technical capacity41 or liable to “break down under its
own weight.” 42 Neo-conservative scholars and politicians fixed upon these
critiques to launch aggressive programs of environmental deregulation and
spending cuts. By the mid-1990s, however, many governments and regulation
scholars began to take more nuanced approaches to the problem, seeking to
reinvent environmental regulation in ways that built on its early successes and
at the same time recognized its limitations.
Smart regulation has been embraced, in various forms, by governments and
intergovernmental organizations around the world. In Canada, its most recent
manifestation was the previous federal government’s Smart Regulation
initiative, launched in 2005. The initiative’s stated goal was to create better, not
less, regulation. 43 It was continued under a different name, but with
substantially the same emphasis, by the current federal government (elected in
January 2006). 44 It involves a restructuring of the process of assessing,
reforming, and improving the regime in which regulations are developed,
managed, enforced, and measured.
There is always a risk that the smart regulation agenda will be hijacked by
the very neo-conservative deregulatory agenda it was meant to displace. Leading
Canadian environmental groups have criticized the federal government’s smart
regulation initiative for precisely this reason. They argue that it is a deregulatory

41. Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, ibid.
42. Orts, supra note 22 at 1241.
43. The word “smart” was an acronym for “Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and
Timely.” Reg Alcock, President of the Treasury Board of Canada, “Government of Canada’s
Implementation Plan for Smart Regulation,” (Speech delivered to the National Press Club at
the Launch of the Government of Canada’s Implementation Plan for Smart Regulation,
Ottawa, 24 March 2005), online: <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/media/ps-dp/2005/0324_e.asp?
printable=True>.
44. The current Conservative government calls it “performance-based regulation.” See
Government of Canada, “Regulation,” online: <http://www.regulation.gc.ca>.
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agenda in disguise, prioritizing business over public health, safety, and the
environment, neglecting the need to apply and enforce existing environmental
regulations, and ignoring evidence that command regulation can be more
effective than voluntary or non-regulatory approaches. They also believe it
ignores evidence that international harmonization tends to exert downward
pressure on environmental, health, and safety standards and to hamper the
transparency, accountability, timeliness, and effectiveness of regulation.45
These objections are a useful reminder that smart regulation is not just
about greater flexibility, competitiveness, and lower regulatory costs for
regulated businesses. It must balance these attributes with the imperatives to
protect public health, safety, welfare, and environmental integrity, and to
promote environmentally and socially sustainable economic development.
Strong and effective laws and regulations can and should maintain a prominent
place in a sophisticated mix of policy instruments.
Smart regulation also needs to address one of the principal limitations of
traditional environmental regulation. Environmental regulation was and
remains aimed overwhelmingly at large, stationary, point-source polluters—that
is, big industrial facilities. By contrast, many of the most pressing contemporary
environmental challenges—including habitat destruction, biodiversity loss,
climate change, and persistent toxic pollution—are of a different, potentially
more intractable character, because they are the cumulative results of the
everyday choices and actions of countless people and organizations that control
innumerable geographically dispersed, often mobile, non-point sources of
pollution. To address these problems, we must mobilize and influence a much
broader range of actors, including individuals, households, and—crucially, as
we will argue toward the end of the article—small business.
45. Letter from the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) to Prime Minister Paul
Martin Regarding Report of the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation (22
October 2004), online: <http://www.cela.ca/publications/cardfile.shtml?x=2051>; Letter
from CELA et al. to Chair and Members of the External Advisory Committee on Smart
Regulation Regarding the Need to Give Regulatory Priority to Health, Safety and
Environmental Protection (16 August 2004), online: <http://www.cela.ca/publications/
cardfile.shtml?x=2016>; and Chris Rolfe & Karen Campbell, West Coast Environmental
Law Association, West Coast Environmental Law’s Comments on ‘Smart Regulation for Canada’
(Submitted to the External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation, August 2004), online:
Library and Archives Canada <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/committees/
smart_regulation-ef/2006-10-11/www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/smartreg-regint/en/06/01/su-22.pdf>.
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Finally, a dimension of smart regulation that has risen to prominence in
recent years is an emphasis on the role of non-state actors and institutions.46
Some researchers have examined the potential role of EMSs and other nongovernmental initiatives in smart regulation. 47 The federal government’s
smart regulation directive recognizes this issue, instructing government
decision makers to “make use of all or parts of relevant national or
international standards, guidelines, and recommendations as a basis for
technical regulations and for conformity assessment procedures when they
fulfill intended policy objectives.”48 This brings us to the central question of
this article: what role can standards play in smart regulation? We answer this
question in the form of six principles for regulators, arising out of the
experience with Ontario’s EPs regulations.
III. HOW TO INTEGRATE STANDARDS INTO SMART REGULATION: SIX
PRINCIPLES
PRINCIPLE 1: DO NOT REINVENT THE WHEEL

The first lesson to be drawn from the Ontario EPs regulations is not to reinvent
the wheel. If a recognized standards development body has gone to the trouble
of developing a widely accepted, consensus-based standard that fulfills the
objectives of a proposed regulation, incorporate the existing standard into the
regulatory scheme as far as possible and appropriate, instead of drafting a new
specification from scratch.

46. See e.g. Colin Scott, “Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory
State” in Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds., The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004) 145.
47. See e.g. Robert B. Gibson, ed., Voluntary Initiatives and The New Politics of Corporate
Greening (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1999); Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair,
supra note 4; Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Leaders & Laggards: Next-Generation
Environmental Regulation (Sheffield: Greenleaf, 2002); and Kernaghan Webb, ed., Voluntary
Codes: Private Governance, the Public Interest and Innovation (Ottawa: Carleton Research
Unit for Innovation, Science and Environment, Carleton University, 2004), online:
<http://www.carleton.ca/spa/VolCode/Volcode.htm> [Voluntary Codes].
48. Government of Canada, Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation (Ottawa: Government
of Canada, 2007) at 6, online: <http://www.regulation.gc.ca/directive/directive-eng.pdf>.
This directive replaced the previous Liberal government’s Cabinet directive on smart
regulation, which contained an identical provision.
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When the government of Ontario decided to develop regulations offering
an EP reduction to violators with an EMS in place, it had a choice. It could
adopt ISO 14001 or another existing standard as a benchmark against which
management systems would be judged. Alternatively, it could develop its own
EMS requirements from scratch. ISO 14001 is the product of many thousands
of hours of deliberation by hundreds of experts over more than a decade. These
experts hail from industry, environmental consulting firms, standards
development organizations, government, consumer groups, and—to a lesser
extent—environmental groups and research institutions, representing dozens of
countries and international organizations. These experts, mostly volunteers,
developed ISO 14001 over an initial four-year period and saw it through a
further five-year revision process that culminated with the publication of the
second edition in 2004. This work followed the consensus-based standards
development model of ISO and its member bodies. In theory, standards are
established by consensus of all major interests, from big and small business to
governments, consumers, public interest groups, and scientists. While this ideal
is never realized perfectly in practice, ISO 14001 represents the closest
approximation we have to a global consensus on what an environmental
management system should look like.
Instead of reaping the fruits of this collective experience and expertise, the
government of Ontario expended substantial time and energy drafting its own
detailed description of the requirements an EMS must meet to qualify for the
reduction. The government may have had cogent reasons for promulgating its
own purpose-built EMS standard. For one thing, it may have wished, quite
reasonably, to accommodate the diversity of approaches to EMSs. For another,
it may have felt that an ISO 14001-based EMS, on its own, would not respond
adequately to public policy objectives such as improved spill prevention,
corrective action, legal compliance, and corporate transparency.
Given these considerations, why should regulatory authorities incorporate
existing non-governmental standards into statutes or regulations? The
Standards Council of Canada (SCC) identifies five reasons:
(a)
(b)

(c)

the standards have been developed by balanced committees of all relevant
interests, employing the principles of consensus;
the standards have undergone a public review process as well as a “second
level review” by the [standards development organization] prior to
publication;
the standards are maintained and reviewed at appropriate intervals to ensure
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current technological developments are incorporated;
the commercial needs of producers, users, and other interests are addressed at
the development stage, thus ensuing regulations referencing these standards
are more amenable to commercial acceptance; and,
the standards address the national public interest by considering to the extent
possible as appropriate to the subject of the standard, how it advances the
national economy, supports sustainable development, benefits the health,
safety and welfare of workers and the public, assists and protects consumers
and facilitates trade.49

As we noted earlier, standards have two key characteristics that distinguish
them from legislation. First, they are approved by a recognized body. Second,
they are established by consensus.
“Recognized body” usually means an organization recognized by the
relevant national or international body responsible for accrediting standards
development organizations. Although there may occasionally be a question of
whether a particular body is or should be a “recognized body,” the central
players are uncontroversial. ISO is one of them, along with its national member
bodies, and it occupies a peculiar niche, perched between the public and private
sectors. It acts as a bridging organization, striving for consensus on standards
that meet the needs of both society and business. ISO membership is open to
the one body in each country that is the most representative of standardization
in its country. Many ISO member bodies, especially in developing and
transitional countries, are government agencies or quasi-public bodies with
their mandates set out by legislation. ISO member bodies in some
industrialized countries have their roots in the private sector, representing
national partnerships of industry associations.50
Canada’s ISO member body is the Standards Council of Canada, a federal
crown corporation created by statute in 1970. Its mandate is to foster and
promote voluntary standardization in Canada. Although it reports to
Parliament and is financed partially by parliamentary appropriation, it is

49. Standards Council of Canada (SCC), Key Considerations in the Development and Use of
Standards in Legislative Instruments: Understanding the Partnership of the Regulatory and
Voluntary Standards Systems (Ottawa: Standards Council of Canada, 2006) at 3 (s. 3.3,
General Principles), online: <http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/brochures/index.shtml>
[SCC, “Key Considerations”].
50. International Organization for Standardization, “About ISO,” online: <http://www.iso.org/
iso/about.htm>.

366

(2008) 46 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

independent of government in its policies and operations. The SCC oversees
Canada’s National Standards System and coordinates Canadian input to foreign
and international standardization forums, including ISO. The National
Standards System is a network of more than 400 organizations and more than
fifteen thousand individuals involved in standards development, promotion,
and implementation in Canada.51 The SCC does not develop standards itself. It
has accredited four standards development organizations to develop National
Standards of Canada. The Canadian Standards Association (CSA) is one of
these.52 We will focus on the CSA, since it is responsible for developing Canadian
EMS standards. The CSA is an independent, not-for-profit, membership-based
association that serves business, industry, government, and consumers.53
A standard developed by the CSA or ISO may be submitted to the SCC for
approval as a National Standard of Canada if it meets the following criteria:
• it was developed by a committee that had balanced representation of all
stakeholders including consumer and public interests and followed a
consensus process,
• the standard was subjected to public review,
• it has been published in both official languages,
• it is consistent with existing international standards, and
• it does not constitute an illegitimate barrier to trade.54

This brings us to the principle of consensus. It is the key to the standards
community’s claim to credibility. The SCC adopts ISO’s definition of
consensus as “general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained
opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests
and by a process seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned
and to reconcile any conflicting arguments.” 55 Consensus implies the

51. For a description of the Canadian National Standards System see Standards Council of
Canada, “National Standards System,” online: <http://www.scc.ca/en/nss/>.
52. The others are the Bureau de Normalisation du Québec (BNQ), the Canadian General
Standards Board (CGSB), and the Underwriters Laboratories of Canada (ULC).
53. See Canadian Standards Association (CSA), online: <http://www.csa.ca>.
54. See e.g. Standards Council of Canada, CAN-P-2F, Requirements and Procedures for the
Request for, Development, Approval, Preparation, and Maintenance of National Standards of
Canada (Ottawa: SCC, 2006), online: <http://www.scc.ca/en/publications/criteria/
all.shtml> [CAN-P-2F].
55. CAN-P-1E, supra note 9, s. 2.1, quoting ISO/IEC Guide 2, supra note 5, s. 1.7.
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satisfaction of two conditions. The first is that representatives of all interest
categories participate effectively in standards development. The second is that
there is no sustained opposition from any significant segment of interested
parties at any critical stage in the development of a standard.
The principle of consensus is manifested in the structure of standardization
committees and their decision-making processes. The SCC and CSA require
that committee membership reflect a “balanced matrix” of interested and
affected parties, so that no single interest category can dominate the process.56
The SCC and CSA recognize four interest categories:
• Producers (those predominantly involved in production of products, materials or
services, which usually means business firms);
• Users (those who predominantly represent end users of the subject products,
materials or services, including consumers);
• Regulators (government bodies involved in regulating the subject products,
materials or services); and
• General interest (those with a demonstrated interest who do not fall into the other
categories, such as academics, scientists, and public interest NGOs).57

Other interest categories may be identified when relevant to the work of
particular committees. In environmental management standards committees,
for example, “service/professional” is recognized as a separate interest category
to reflect the important role of environmental management professionals.
Each CSA standards development committee’s membership matrix must
be approved by a strategic steering committee responsible for overseeing its
work.58 The matrix defines interest categories appropriate to the committee’s
scope and stipulates the minimum and maximum numbers of voting members
for each interest category. The actual number of voting members in any one
category may not exceed the sum of the actual number of voting members in
the two smallest interest categories. If the committee is out of balance, no vote
may be taken until balance is restored.
The principles of balanced representation and consensus decision making
are, not surprisingly, realized imperfectly in practice. The SCC recognizes the
56. CAN-P-2F, supra note 54, s. 3.1.5.
57. Ibid.; see also Canadian Standards Association, CSA Directives and Guidelines Governing
Standardization, Part 1: Participants and Organizational Structure (Etobicoke: CSA, 1999), s.
3.3.3 [CSA Directives].
58. CSA Directives, ibid., s. 3.3.

368

(2008) 46 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

“particular challenges in finding the resources to permit participation by small
and medium enterprises (SMEs), academics, and consumers.”59 The CSA and
ISO have been criticized for inadequate participation by labour, consumers,
ENGOs, and SMEs.60 There are various obstacles to effective participation by
these interest categories, including competing priorities, lack of awareness, and
limited resources, time, and technical capacity. Most ENGOs shun multistakeholder processes in general, whether governmental or non-governmental,
because the emphasis on consensus dilutes ENGO voices and constrains their
ability to employ confrontational or populist tactics. This makes it difficult to
maintain a balanced matrix in some cases. Nonetheless, the CSA and SCC do
more than most ISO member bodies to ensure equal and effective participation
by all interested and affected parties, and often fare no worse than typical
government policy-making processes in this regard. As a result, the Canadian
“balanced matrix” approach to standards development is frequently cited as an
example for other ISO member bodies to follow.
Let us now consider the development of EMS standards. ISO 14001 is a
management system standard. It is designed to help any organization improve
how it manages the environmental impacts of its activities, products, or
services. The organization may be a for-profit private sector enterprise, a not-for
profit organization, or a public sector entity. ISO 14001 outlines the
requirements of a well-functioning EMS, but it does not dictate how these
requirements are to be fulfilled. The how is the responsibility of the adopting
organization. This allows ISO 14001 to accommodate the diversity of
organizations, cultures, and economic regions.
Considering this diversity, it is amazing that agreement on an international
EMS standard was achieved at all. There has to be substantial agreement,
without sustained opposition from any significant portion of the interested
parties at the table, for a standard to be voted and accepted as an ISO
document. Consensus has to be achieved not just at the international level
but also in each ISO member body, where national negotiating positions are
59. CAN-P-1E, supra note 9, s. 1.1.
60. See e.g. Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy, CSA Environmental Standards
Writing: Barriers to Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations Involvement (Toronto:
CIELAP, 1997); Pollution Probe, Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (ENGO)
Participation in National Standards Setting (Toronto: Pollution Probe, 2002); and Krut &
Gleckman, supra note 14.
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worked out and decisions ultimately made whether to adopt an ISO
standard nationally.
ISO 14001 was developed within an ISO committee known as ISO
Technical Committee 207, by a subcommittee known as ISO TC 207/SC 1.
Canadian experts played important roles in the negotiation of the original
standard and its recent revision. Throughout this process, Canada’s position in
the international negotiations was developed by a national “mirror committee,”
the SCC’s Canadian Advisory Committee on SC 1 (CAC/SC 1). This mirror
committee also serves as the CSA technical committee responsible for
developing national EMS standards (the Technical Committee on EMSs, or
TC/EMS). 61 As such, the committee members wear two hats. When
deliberating Canadian positions in the international standards development
process, they act as CAC/SC 1. When considering whether to adopt a final ISO
standard as a National Standard of Canada or other issues affecting domestic
EMS standardization, they act as TC/EMS. Either way, the committee is
bound by the balanced matrix and consensus requirements described above.
This multi-stakeholder Canadian EMS standards committee deliberated at
great length the merits of ISO 14001 for use in Canada.
The existence of ISO 14001 is a testament to global recognition of the
challenge of sound environmental management. It also reflects recognition of
the benefits of a common framework for comparison of EMSs across different
organizational, social, and economic contexts. ISO 14001’s flexibility is critical,
as there are over 150 million legally constituted enterprises in the world. Over
95 per cent of these are SMEs.62 When properly integrated, the management
system for each one would reflect something of its unique business culture, even
though there would be similarities within a sector or business type.
When drafting its EPs regulations, the Ontario government could have
incorporated ISO 14001 as a baseline for the EMS component of the
regulations. It did not: ISO 14001 was not even mentioned in the draft

61. CSA environmental committee names and structures were changed in late 2007, but the
basic model of a combined national and international “mirror” committee on EMS
standards was maintained.
62. International Finance Corporation, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises: A Collection of
Published Data (Washington: IFC, 2006).
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regulations. Instead, the government drafted its own homegrown, six-page63
EMS standard more or less from scratch. This included a fifty-page guidance
document and a table listing some differences between the regulatory EMS and
ISO 14001. The draft regulations ignored more than a decade of complex
international negotiations, delicate compromises, and multi-stakeholder
national deliberations over ISO 14001.
The idea of regulatory incentives for implementation of robust EMSs is
good. One of the central goals of smart regulation is to enlist the self-critical,
reflexive capacities of regulated actors. As we noted previously, EMSs are a good
example of reflexive instruments. Regulations encouraging EMS adoption
preserve a high degree of autonomy for regulated entities. We live in liberaldemocratic capitalist societies, in which individual autonomy and private
enterprise are fundamental values. Business owners value autonomy so that they
can respond quickly, efficiently, and profitably to market needs.
Encouragement of autonomy also makes sense from a regulator’s perspective,
within limits. It is more effective and efficient to induce regulated entities to
exercise their autonomy in a direction that achieves democratically determined
public policy goals, than to intervene in the minutiae of regulated firms’
operations.64 Governments that promote policies encouraging EMS adoption
can expect to benefit from more independent action that may conceivably place
many organizations ahead of regulatory requirements, provided the EMSs are
sufficiently robust. Regulations that encourage the adoption of credible and
robust EMSs can, therefore, exploit the autonomous, reflexive capacities of
regulated organizations in the service of collective goals.
Unfortunately, by attempting, in effect, to write a whole new EMS standard
in its EPs regulations, the Ontario government passed up an opportunity to save
public policy development costs by taking advantage of the substantial expertise,
time, and money that went into the development of the existing ISO 14001
standard. This would have been an effective way to move a portion of the cost
63. For comparison, this is approximately the same length as the requirements clause of ISO
14001. See ISO 14001:2004, supra note 2, clause 4.
64. See e.g. Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, “Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of
Government” (1992) 43 Brit. J. Sociology 173 at 184; Peter N. Grabosky, “Using NonGovernmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance” (1995) 8 Governance 527;
Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, supra note 4 at 10, 123-25; and Nikolas Rose, Powers of
Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 50.

WOOD & JOHANNSON, SIX PRINCIPLES FOR SMART REGULATION

371

of policy development off the public budget and enlist non-governmental
resources in the development of public policy instruments.65 Incorporating an
existing National Standard of Canada into the EPs regulations instead of
rewriting it from scratch would also have had other advantages, including:
• Presenting a regulatory solution that was likely to meet the expectations of a
majority of the stakeholders addressed by the regulation, since the standard was
developed by a consensus of various interests;
• Embodying the knowledge and experience of a wider range of experts than the
government might normally have at its disposal;
• Enhancing uniformity of requirements faced by regulated entities, thereby
reducing regulated entities’ costs and eliminating barriers to movement of goods
and services;
• Enhancing the likelihood of voluntary, market-driven compliance with
regulations, thereby reducing the burden of regulatory oversight; and
• Enhancing social efficiency, insofar as regulated entities use the same tool to meet
both market and regulatory needs.66

Instead, the homegrown EMS opened up the door to uncertainty and
unanticipated costs.
Standards are usually incorporated into regulation by reference—that is,
the standard is referred to rather than reproduced in the regulation. 67
Occasionally, governments reproduce standards or parts of standards verbatim
in regulations. This is true of the EMAS regulation, which reproduces Clause 4
of ISO 14001 word for word as the EMS component of the scheme. Standards
are typically revised from time to time, necessitating amendment of the
corresponding regulation and posing the risk of inconsistency if there is a lag
between publication of the revised standard and amendment of the regulation.68
65. See Grabosky, ibid.
66. SCC, “Key Considerations,” supra note 49 at 6 (s. 5.1.1).
67. For the various ways voluntary standards can be incorporated into official legal systems, see
Stepan Wood, “Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada:
Rethinking Environmental Governance,” (2002-2003) 10 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 129 [Wood,
“Environmental Management Systems”]; Stepan Wood, “Green Revolution or Greenwash?
Voluntary Environmental Standards, Public Law, and Private Authority in Canada” in Law
Commission of Canada, ed., New Perspectives on the Public-Private Divide (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2003) at 123 [Wood, “Green Revolution”]; and Errol
Meidinger, “Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer
Than You May Think” (2001) 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10162.
68. Indeed, the EMAS regulation had to be amended after ISO 14001:2004 was published in
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Incorporation by reference, by contrast, allows regulators to accommodate
subsequent changes to a standard without the necessity of further regulation. In
this way regulation can respond easily and quickly to technical changes. The
trade-off is reduced control over the content of regulation, which may be
undesirable from the regulator’s perspective. 69 In some cases it may even
constitute an impermissible delegation of authority.70
Nothing we have said is meant to suggest that standards eliminate the need
for regulation or that non-governmental standards-setting bodies are a
substitute for democratically elected governments. All we claim is that there are
compelling reasons for regulators, at every jurisdictional level, to look carefully
at how incorporation of voluntary standards into regulation might contribute
to the achievement of public policy goals. In particular, they should consider
referring to existing, consensus-based, non-governmental standards, rather than
“reinventing the wheel” and drafting their own standards from scratch.
Not only did the Ontario government choose not to incorporate ISO
14001 by reference into its regulatory scheme, the EMS standard it devised for
the draft regulations deviated substantially from ISO 14001. This brings us to
our second lesson.
PRINCIPLE 2: STRIVE FOR CONSISTENCY

The second principle we offer from the Ontario experience is that, where a
widely accepted standard already exists on the subject, creation of unexplained
inconsistencies between the proposed regulation and the standard should be
avoided. At first glance, the EMS described in the draft regulations was broadly
consistent with ISO 14001. Even on a cursory examination, however, there
order to incorporate the revised standard into the regulation.
69. The Standards Council of Canada identifies three preferred methods of reference: dated
identification of a specific issue of a standard, dated identification of a specific issue of a
standard as amended from time to time, and undated identification. SCC, “Key
Considerations,” supra note 49 at 7 (s. 5.2, Methods of Referencing Standards). The latter
two accommodate subsequent changes to the standard, but reduce the regulator’s control
and may raise issues of impermissible delegation in some cases.
70. See e.g. State v. Crawford, 177 P. 360 (Kan. 1919) at 361, quoted in Harm Schepel, The
Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets
(Oxford: Hart, 2005) at 1 (holding a Kansas statute requiring electrical wiring to be in
accordance with the National Fire Protection Association’s National Electrical Code to be so
obviously invalid “that elaborate illustration or discussion of its infirmities are unnecessary”).
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were numerous significant discrepancies in terminology, concepts, scope, and
other features. For the most part, these discrepancies were unacknowledged and
unexplained, creating ambiguity as to how, if at all, the requirements of ISO
14001 differed from those of the regulations. The guidance document
accompanying the regulation 71 attempted to explain some differences and
similarities between the regulatory EMS and ISO 14001. However, it
compounded the problem by failing to identify many discrepancies and giving
the impression that the regulations and ISO 14001 were aligned more closely
than their actual text would suggest. This problem, had it persisted in the final
regulations, would have rendered largely counterproductive the province’s
otherwise welcome effort to incorporate EMSs into its regulatory system.
In the end, the final EPs regulations simply eliminated the homegrown
regulatory EMS, rendering our criticism moot in certain respects. The episode
stands, however, as a cautionary tale for other regulators and underlines the
importance of being alert to unproductive discrepancies between regulations
and existing, widely used standards. This is especially important, since it
appears that the government intended the regulatory EMS to be consistent with
ISO 14001. The problem is that language is critical in international standards,
as it is in regulation. Even very small, seemingly inconsequential differences in
text can give rise to inconsistency, ambiguity, and uncertainty for implementing
businesses, conformity assessors, and interested parties. Almost every word of
ISO 14001 was the subject of intense domestic and international negotiation.
Key terms such as “prevention of pollution,” “continual improvement,”
“control and influence,” “significance,” and “activities, products and services”
were the subjects of prolonged debate in the initial development and subsequent
revision of ISO 14001. The resulting text reflects hard-won and often delicate
compromise. What appear to be minor departures from accepted terminology
may thus be perceived as major inconsistencies by EMS practitioners.
Moreover, as a standard such as ISO 14001 spreads throughout the market
and users, consultants, and conformity-assessment professionals gain experience
with it, a whole set of understandings and expectations builds up as to its
meaning. Even minor departures from the established terminology can inject
substantial uncertainty into the market. Fear of such disruption was one of the
reasons that the recent revision of ISO 14001 was restricted to clarification of
71. See Draft EPs Guideline, supra note 34.
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the intent of the original standard and enhanced compatibility with ISO 9001.
“No new requirements” was the watchword of the revision, reflecting the
importance attached by the international EMS standards community to
ensuring continuity and predictability, while not disturbing the delicate
compromises embodied in the language of the standard.72
There were three kinds of discrepancies between Ontario’s homegrown
EMS and ISO 14001: inconsistent scope and terminology, extra requirements,
and weakened requirements. As for scope and terminology, the homegrown
EMS applied to a “plant,” whereas an ISO 14001 EMS applies to an
“organization.” The two terms were defined differently, causing confusion
whether a firm with an ISO 14001 EMS would have to expand or restrict the
scope of its EMS to qualify for the EP reduction. The Schedule also required
plants to identify every “process, practice, material, product or energy use” that
may affect the natural environment.73 The government asserted that this was
equivalent to ISO 14001’s requirement to identify the “environmental aspects”
of the organization’s “activities, products and services.”74 But identification of
environmental aspects and impacts was among the most difficult and
controversial issues in the revision of the standard. 75 So much energy was
expended in reaching an international consensus on the appropriate language
that any departure from it would have occasioned considerable anxiety among
thousands of organizations, consultants, and auditors that use ISO 14001.
Finally, the regulations would have required a plant’s EMS to be audited against
the requirements of the regulation rather than against ISO 14001. This blurred
the line between EMSs and compliance audits. The government also failed to
72. The “no new requirements” rule was not observed to the letter. For a Canadian perspective,
see CSA Technical Committee on EMS, Guidance for Canadian Users on Changes Between
ISO 14001:1996 and ISO 14001:2004 (Mississauga: CSA, 2004) [copy on file with authors].
73. Draft EPs Regulation, supra note 34, Sch. 1.
74. Draft EPs Guideline, supra note 34 at 48; ISO 14001:2004, supra note 2.
75. This issue was so contentious during the recent revision process that its elaboration was
confined to ISO 14001’s companion guidance standard, ISO 14004. See Canadian
Standards Association, National Standard of Canada CAN/CSA-ISO 14004:04 (ISO
14004:2004), Environmental management systems – General guidelines on principles, systems
and support techniques, 2d ed. (Mississauga: CSA, 2004). Developing agreed guidance on
“aspects, impacts and significance” consumed almost three years, hundreds of pages of
comments, and untold volunteer hours. Johannson, who chaired the ISO task group on this
issue, tallied more than two hundred hours managing the international negotiation process.
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consider several key issues: who would accredit auditors to conduct these audits,
what training auditors would need, whether their insurers would cover such
services, and at what additional cost. It was unclear, in short, whether the
private market would be willing or able to supply the required certifications.
The second way in which the homegrown EMS departed from ISO 14001
was by introducing extra requirements beyond those found in ISO 14001. The
government explicitly acknowledged two of these additional requirements.
First, the draft regulations required a policy commitment to “pollution
prevention” (P2), i.e., the use of “processes, practices, materials, products and
energy that avoid or minimize the creation of pollutants and wastes at the
source.”76 This is stronger than ISO 14001’s requirement of a commitment to
“prevention of pollution” (POP). POP is defined as including recycling and
end-of-pipe pollution control. This was another hotly debated issue in the
development of ISO 14001. Next, the draft regulations required an external
audit of the EMS and certification by the external auditor that the EMS meets
all the requirements of the regulations. While ISO 14001 requires periodic
internal EMS audits, it does not require external audits or certification. It is up
to the adopting organization to choose how to demonstrate its conformity to
the standard. ISO 14001 recognizes four options: self-declaration, second-party
assessment (by a customer or other interested party), confirmation of selfdeclaration by an external party, and third party certification. In addition,
there were several extra requirements that the government did not
acknowledge, including much greater documentation requirements, 77 a
requirement to rank-order all environmental aspects based on the significance
of their potential adverse effects,78 and a requirement that all environmental
targets be quantifiable.79

76. Draft EPs Regulation, supra note 34, s. 19(1) and Sch. 1.
77. This was in stark contrast to the second edition of ISO 14001, which reflected a hard won
international consensus that documentation requirements had to be reduced to make EMSs
more accessible to small organizations.
78. The determination of significance relies heavily on informed judgment and is affected by a
host of variables. See e.g. Canadian Standards Association International, Plus 1145: A Guide
to Identifying Significant Environmental Aspects (Toronto: CSA International, 1999).
Requiring an explicit ranking of significant aspects would add little value.
79. ISO 14001 recognizes that quantification is not always practicable. ISO 14001:2004, supra
note 2, clause 4.3.3.
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Finally—and remarkably—the requirements of the homegrown EMS also
appeared to be weaker than those of ISO 14001 in several respects. First, the
regulations would only have required plants to identify environmental aspects
with adverse effects, whereas ISO 14001 requires organizations to identify and
manage aspects that have significant adverse or beneficial impacts. Second, the
regulations only included environmental aspects over which the plant has
“control,” while ISO 14001 applies to aspects the organization controls and
those over which the organization determines it has an influence. In other
words, ISO 14001 has the potential to reach farther up or down the value chain
than the homegrown EMS would. The question of “control and influence” is
another perennially controversial issue in ISO 14001. The delicacy of the
compromise reflected in the language of ISO 14001 on this issue cannot be
overemphasized. Last, the draft regulations’ requirements for training,
awareness, and competence reflected an outdated approach, focused on taskspecific formal training. This was rejected explicitly and replaced with a more
holistic approach in the recent revision of ISO 14001. This new approach
emphasizes competence more broadly. It also emphasizes the importance of
educating personnel as to why conformity with the EMS matters and what
might happen when established procedures are not followed. The EPs guidance
document neither acknowledged these apparent downward departures from
ISO 14001, nor offered any explanation for them.
To recapitulate, we do not believe that the government intended to create
significant discrepancies in language, concepts, terminology, and requirements
between the regulatory EMS and the leading internationally recognized EMS
standard. But that is what it did. Moreover, it failed to explain or acknowledge
most of these discrepancies. This would have led to confusion, anxiety, and
resistance among regulated industries and environmental management
professionals. After hearing from EMS experts and industry, the government
withdrew its homegrown EMS specification from the final EPs regulations. We
are not suggesting, however, that governments should simply adopt nongovernmental standards. Far from it: there are many circumstances when public
policy legitimately demands more than what such standards have to offer. This
brings us to our third principle.
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PRINCIPLE 3: MAKE ANY EXTRA REQUIREMENTS CLEAR

If an existing, widely accepted standard does not, on its own, meet all the
public policy goals of the proposed regulation, public authorities should
identify as clearly as possible how the standard is deficient and what more is
required to meet public policy objectives. As noted in the previous section, to
qualify for an EP reduction, a regulated firm’s EMS would have had to meet
extra requirements beyond ISO 14001. This is not a problem in itself. It is a
government’s prerogative, as guardian of the public interest, to ask firms to do
more than just demonstrate conformity to a voluntary standard in return for
regulatory benefits. A government may, for instance, want firms to put greater
emphasis on pollution prevention, environmental performance improvement,
public transparency, or community consultation than ISO 14001 requires.
What is important, however, is that the regulator should specify any extra or
different requirements clearly, so that firms, auditors, regulators, and other
interested parties can readily identify what is expected.80 Ideally, they should
provide a rationale for the extra or different requirements, so that firms,
auditors, and others can assess the value of going the extra mile. For the most
part, the Ontario government failed to do either of these things.
Two of the draft regulations’ additional requirements were acknowledged
explicitly in the accompanying guidance document. The first was the
requirement of a policy commitment to pollution prevention. The second was
the requirement of an external third party audit certifying conformity with the
regulatory EMS specification. As noted earlier, the other additional
requirements were implicit, unacknowledged, and uncertain in scope and
effect. The only extra requirement for which the government offered a rationale
was the commitment to pollution prevention (P2) as opposed to ISO 14001’s
“prevention of pollution,” (POP) which, as noted, includes end-of-pipe
pollution control. The rationale was familiar to anyone knowledgeable about
the concept of pollution prevention:

80. Europe’s voluntary EMAS regulation is a good example. It incorporates ISO 14001 as its
EMS specification, and specifies separately the extra requirements for participating facilities.
See EMAS, supra note 20. For a summary of the main differences between EMAS and ISO
14001 see European Commission, “Frequently Asked Questions – What is the difference
between ISO 14001 and EMAS?”, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/tools/
faq_en.htm#difference>.
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[P]ollution prevention is a process that regularly and systematically examines root
causes of all wastes generated and seeks to eliminate the causes of pollution rather
than treating the symptoms. Pollution prevention is the preferred approach at the
top of the environmental management hierarchy, followed by re-use, recycling,
control, treatment, disposal, with remediation and clean-up being the least
preferred option.81

The government of Ontario was not alone in insisting on a commitment to
pollution prevention in return for granting regulatory benefits to firms with
EMSs. Public authorities in several jurisdictions have specified this as an
expectation for the use of EMSs to achieve public policy goals.82
The government offered no rationale, however, for the requirement of an
external audit and certification. ISO 14001 does not require an external audit
or independent third party certification of conformity. It does not specify the
frequency of internal audits, nor does it state that all elements of the EMS must
be reviewed in every audit. It recognizes four conformity assessment options,
designed to suit the varying needs of the market:
1. Making a self-determination and self-declaration;
2. Seeking confirmation of its conformance by parties having an interest in the
organization, such as customers;
3. Seeking confirmation of its self-declaration by a party external to the
organization; or
4. Seeking certification/registration of its environmental management system by an
external organization.83

Option 1 is a first party self-assessment process. Option 2 is an assessment
by someone having an interest in the organization, commonly referred to as a
second party or supplier audit. Options 3 and 4 are performed by independent
external parties. Option 3 was added in the 2004 revision, largely to
accommodate the EnviroReady Report process, in which a professional
accountant with specific training confirms the presence of the ISO 14001
elements.84 This is cheaper and more streamlined than third party certification.
81. Draft EPs Guideline, supra note 34 at 52-53.
82. See e.g. Enforcement Cooperation Program of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC), Improving Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: 10 Elements of
Effective Management Systems (Montreal: Commission for Environmental Cooperation,
2000) at 3, online: <http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/LAWPOLICY/guide-e_EN.pdf>.
83. ISO 14001:2004, supra note 2, Introduction.
84. “EnviroReady Report” is owned by E2 Management Corporation. For information on the
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It was created specifically to address the needs of SMEs by making external
confirmation of ISO 14001 implementation economically viable for them.
Option 4 is formal third party certification or registration by an accredited ISO
14001 certifier. This is typically the costliest of the four options.85 Most SMEs
have shunned it for reasons of cost and culture.
Option 4 was the only option recognized by the draft regulations. No
rationale was offered for this restrictive and costly approach, which would
effectively have disqualified the vast majority of Ontario firms from eligibility
for the EMS-based EP reduction.86 We can, however, guess. Many ENGOs,
governments, and scholars believe that third party certification is the only
effective guarantee of the credibility of a firm’s claims about implementation of
voluntary environmental initiatives. This insistence may be well-founded in
specific cases, but not in others. First, it is based on the mistaken assumption of
a binary choice between self-declaration and third party certification, and
overlooks the existence of the intermediate options mentioned earlier. Second,
many firms find that the cost of third party certification outweighs the resulting
benefits. Third, the evidence does not show that ISO 14001 certification
generates better environmental results than ISO 14001 implementation by
itself. A recent US study concluded that there was no support “for the
proposition that an externally audited, ISO-certified EMS is associated with
greater improvements in environmental performance than uncertified
facilities.”87 Finally, accounting scandals such as Enron and Worldcom remind
us that third party auditors themselves may not always be as objective and
independent as we would like. At the best of times, auditors face a dilemma, as
Andrews et al. point out:
Like financial auditors, EMS auditors face conflicting pressures between the ideals of
environmental professionals and their necessary financial interest in obtaining and
process, see EnviroReady, online: <http://www.14000registry.com>. Johannson is the
coordinating lead person responsible for the development of the EnviroReady Report process
and has a commercial interest in it. Addition of the third conformity assessment option was
proposed by Mexico and accepted by the international committee without objection in 2002.
85. See Table 2 and accompanying discussion, below.
86. Granted, the EPs scheme is currently restricted to large industrial facilities, for many of
which formal EMS certification is not a huge financial obstacle; the government, however,
plans to expand the scheme to other facilities and sectors over time.
87. Andrews et al., supra note 23 at 286.
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retaining business relationships with the audited firms. If they take an excessively
permissive stance their credibility may be poor, but a highly rigorous position may
cause them to lose business to more accommodating competitors.88

Our goal here is not to settle the certification debate, but to note that the
Ontario government failed to articulate any rationale for demanding third party
certification. Nor did it acknowledge the associated trade-offs, such as the
higher cost to regulated firms. As a result, it set a precedent that effectively
excluded small business.
The development of Ontario’s EPs regulations presented a welcome and
long overdue opportunity for a serious public conversation about the role of
ISO 14001 in the pursuit of public policy goals, and the relationship between
voluntary standardization and official regulation generally. This would have
been a good chance to articulate what should be expected from regulated
entities in exchange for favourable regulatory treatment. What suffices in an
environmental enforcement context (as in the case of EPs) may not, for
instance, be adequate in the context of environmental leadership programs,
such as the US EPA’s Performance Track89 or Ontario’s Environmental Leaders
program.90 What works for large, regulated entities often does not work for
small business. Additionally, what is appropriate for one regulated sector may
not be appropriate for others.
Such a conversation should also have considered the mounting empirical
evidence about the effects of EMSs on environmental performance, legal
compliance, financial results, and competitiveness. 91 Furthermore, it should
have considered the inevitable trade-offs involved in any decision about
departing from existing consensus-based, non-governmental standards. Extra
requirements should be justified not only in terms of the public policy benefits
they promise to achieve, but also against the opportunity costs. They should
also consider the potential negative impacts on business certainty, risk, and
competitiveness of departing from internationally accepted standards.

88. Ibid. at 203.
89. US Environmental Protection Agency, “National Environmental Performance Track,”
online: <http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/>.
90. Ontario, Ministry of the Environment, “Ontario’s Environmental Leaders,” online:
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/general/leadership/>.
91. See e.g. Prakash & Potosky, supra note 23.
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Instead of taking the objections it received as an opportunity to engage in a
serious discussion of the government’s public policy objectives and ISO 14001’s
potential contribution to their realization, the Ontario government simply
rewrote the draft regulations to remove the detailed EMS in Schedule 1
altogether. While this was welcomed by many industry stakeholders, it was no
substitute for the serious reflection that is needed on the role of ISO 14001 and
other voluntary EMS standards in regulation. The final EPs regulations provide
for a 5 per cent reduction in the gravity component of an environmental
penalty if, at the time of the contravention, the facility has an EMS in place
that meets any one of the following three requirements: it is certified to ISO
14001 by an accredited ISO 14001 registrar; it is audited by an independent,
certified EMS auditor who determines it to conform to ISO 14001; or it is
verified by an authorized Responsible Care verifier to meet the requirements of
the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program. 92 Gone is the detailed,
homegrown EMS specification with all of the discrepancies and ambiguities
that differentiated it from ISO 14001. Gone is the requirement to audit the
EMS against the regulation, which would have blurred the distinction between
a regulatory compliance audit and an EMS audit.
That much is to be congratulated. However, the government’s wholesale
retreat from almost all elements of the draft EMS specification left several
questions unanswered. Why did it abandon the requirement for a commitment
to pollution prevention? Presumably, it had given this issue serious thought and
had cogent reasons for this departure from ISO 14001. The same might be
asked of the other ISO 14001 “extras” that were dropped from the final
version. On the other hand, why did it retain the requirement for an external
audit or ISO 14001 registration? The final regulations stopped short of
accommodating conformity assessment options that are financially and
culturally accessible to the vast majority of SMEs. While the regulations
initially apply only to large, point-source polluters, they set a precedent that
will do nothing to help SMEs.
In short, instead of specifying more carefully how its vision of an acceptable
EMS differed from the requirements of ISO 14001, the government simply
abandoned most of the additional requirements it had initially proposed. In so
doing, it passed up an opportunity for a much needed conversation about the
92. See Final EPs Regulation (O. Reg. 222/07), supra note 1, s. 17.
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role of voluntary EMS standards in regulation. Perhaps some of this difficulty
could have been avoided had the government taken different steps in the runup to this regulatory initiative. This brings us to our fourth principle.
PRINCIPLE 4: CONNECT WITH THE EXPERTS

Our fourth principle is simple: consult relevant standards development
committees when developing regulations. The Ministry of the Environment
engaged in a year-long public consultation process on EPs between September
2005 and September 2006.93 Phase 1 consisted of private “pre-consultations”
with key industry and non-industry stakeholders. Phase 2 featured broad-based
consultations across the province and ended with identification of key issues for
future work. Phase 3 involved the distillation and reporting of stakeholder
input and the establishment of a multi-stakeholder working group to hold
focused discussions on the key issues identified in Phase 2. While all
stakeholder groups were to be represented equally in theory, the majority of
working group members represented large, regulated industrial facilities.94 In
Phase 4, the working group explored issues, reviewed best practices, and made
detailed comments and recommendations. Finally, in Phase 5, the government
reviewed and analyzed the working group’s comments and recommendations.
It then prepared the draft regulations and posted them for public comment.
At no point in this process did the government specifically notify or
consult the relevant organs of the National Standards System—in particular,
the multi-stakeholder committee responsible for development and maintenance
of national environmental management systems standards. No formal channels
of communication were opened between the government and the committee
until after the draft regulations were released for public comment, when

93. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, “Consultation Process: Environmental Penalties”
(Slide presentation presented at the Regional Information Sessions, November 2006) [copy
on file with authors]. In addition, the government commissioned research into the status of
EMS adoption in Ontario and various market participants’ views of EMS standards. The
researcher must have consulted a very limited range of sources, however, because the research
does not appear to have turned up most of the information and concerns identified in this
article, which were well known in the EMS standards community.
94. The working group had eight members representing large industrial polluters, four ENGO
members, one local community group representative, one member representing health units,
and one Ministry of the Environment official who acted as chair. Ibid.
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ministry officials accepted the committee’s invitation to meet and discuss the
EMS component of the regulations.
This was probably an inadvertent oversight, but it deprived the
government of what was undoubtedly the country’s largest collective reservoir
of expertise on EMS standards. It was also inconsistent with one of the
fundamental principles of the Canadian standards system, a principle shared
with most other jurisdictions: that there should be ongoing cooperation and
communication between standards development bodies and regulators,
especially in subject areas on which regulation and standardization overlap. As
the Standards Council of Canada recently stated:
The effective development of a standard suitable for incorporation by reference in a
legislative instrument requires that a cooperative effort between the regulatory
authority and the standards development committee be established from the outset.95

To reap the benefits of consensus-based, non-governmental standards
development activities and to avoid the many potential pitfalls described in this
article, governments should ensure that their key policy development and
legislative drafting personnel are aware of relevant standards development
committees. They should consult with those committees when developing
regulations for subjects on which standards exist.
Ad hoc, project-specific consultation is only one way of engaging with—and
reaping the benefits of—the voluntary standards development process. Another is
to participate actively in the work of standards development committees.
PRINCIPLE 5: PARTICIPATE IN VOLUNTARY STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

This brings us to our fifth principle for regulators: get involved in the work of
relevant standards development committees in order to keep abreast of relevant
issues, gain valuable insight into the reasoning behind standards, and influence
the content of standards on an ongoing basis. According to the SCC,
[r]epresentatives of interested regulatory authorities should be active participants on
the standards development committee. If for reasons of balance, time, or distance
this is not possible, they should be associate or corresponding members who can
make comments and provide input.96

95. SCC, “Key Considerations,” supra note 49 at 4 (s. 4.1.1).
96. Ibid. (s. 4.1.3).

384

(2008) 46 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

The Ontario Ministry of the Environment used to participate regularly in
the national EMS standards committee, but this participation lapsed several
years ago. Periodic invitations to renew the Ministry’s participation were not
acted upon. Other government officials have also sat on the committee,
including representatives of the federal government, other provinces, and
municipalities. Because of the “balanced matrix” rules for the composition of
standards committees, 97 it would not be possible to accommodate
representatives of all potentially interested government bodies. This does not
prevent them from participating as observers, receiving committee
correspondence, obtaining periodic updates, or submitting questions or
concerns to the national committee in the early discussions of policy options or
the design phase of draft regulations.
One obstacle to government participation in standards development bodies
is limited resources, especially due to deep budget and staff cuts in the 1980s
and 1990s. Nonetheless, many environmental agencies are now recovering from
their direst straits. A more substantial obstacle is the belief that it is
inappropriate for government to participate in voluntary standards
development. Such participation might, it is feared, appear to confer
government approval on standards or standards-setting processes which the
government does not have control over and which may not enjoy democratic
legitimacy. Governments also worry that participation in voluntary standards
development might bind them to certain public policy choices concerning the
subject matter of the standard. Finally, they may fear that their participation
might lead courts to treat the resulting standard as the legal standard of conduct
in civil cases or regulatory prosecutions.98 These concerns are not unfounded,
but they can easily be overblown. Government officials participate routinely on
standards development committees of all kinds without approving the resulting
standards for public policy purposes or foreclosing any particular public policy
choices. Additionally, courts are unlikely to give much weight to the fact that
government representatives did or did not participate in standards
development when deciding whether a voluntary standard constitutes the

97. Supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
98. Kernaghan Webb & Andrew Morrison, “The Law and Voluntary Codes: Examining the
‘Tangled Web’” in Voluntary Codes, supra note 47, 97.
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benchmark for “reasonableness” in a tort action or “due diligence” in a
regulatory prosecution.99
These risks must be weighed against the advantages of government
participation in the work of standards development committees. Such
participation allows officials to keep abreast of the latest developments and
innovations in the marketplace. It allows them to influence the content of
standards. Moreover, it allows them to harness non-governmental resources and
foster the reflexive, self-regulatory capacities of regulated communities in the
service of public goals. In most cases, the advantages of government
participation in standards development outweigh the risks.
PRINCIPLE 6: CONSIDER THE NEEDS OF SMALL BUSINESS

We now arrive at what is perhaps the toughest challenge of smart regulation: to
design regulation in a way that effectively enlists small business in the quest for
sustainable development. Both governments and standardization bodies have
failed at this task. Neither the draft nor final EPs regulations make any effort to
address small business. As mentioned, the Ontario EPs scheme applies initially
to large facilities in nine industry sectors. We are not suggesting that the
solution is to extend the EPs regime to all regulated facilities in the province,
big and small. Nonetheless, simply ignoring the characteristics and needs of
small business is no solution. This may sound like the pot calling the kettle
black. The environmental standardization community has also failed to respond
to the needs and challenges of small business. Both governments and
standardization bodies need to learn from mistakes made to date and correct
them, so that all can benefit.
1.

THE SLEEPING GIANT OF THE SUSTAINABILITY STORY

Small business is the sleeping giant of the sustainability story. It has been largely
ignored by policy makers and standards developers. The giant is starting to stir.
And when it wakes—no matter in which direction it moves—it is likely to have
major effects on the environment and society. Small businesses rarely grab
media headlines, but they are well connected to their communities. They may

99. On the use of voluntary standards as legal standards of conduct in civil or criminal cases, see
ibid.; Meidinger, supra note 67; Wood, “Environmental Management Systems,” supra note
67; and Wood, “Green Revolution,” supra note 67.
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not have global brands to protect, but their customers trust them more than
they do big companies. Small businesses cannot afford to engage in massive
publicity exercises, but they have their networks. They typically do not engage
in large scale political lobbying. While associations exist to lobby on their behalf
(such as the Canadian Federation of Independent Business in Canada), in most
countries these are dwarfed by the number and resources of big business
lobbyists. SMEs are extremely numerous, widely dispersed throughout society,
and very closely integrated into the social fabric of the communities in which
they operate.
SMEs make up the vast majority of business organizations. In many
developing countries they dominate the local economy. Even in industrialized
countries, SMEs represent an overwhelming numerical majority of business
organizations and account for a substantial portion of economic activity. In the
United Kingdom, over 99 per cent of all businesses are SMEs.100 In Canada,
1.05 million or 98 per cent of the country’s 1.09 million legally constituted
employer businesses have fewer than one hundred employees, 75 per cent have
fewer than ten employees, and 58 per cent have only one to four employees.101
There are an additional 1.3 million businesses without paid employees.102 Only
0.3 per cent of Canadian employer businesses have 500 employees or more.103
Small businesses contribute a substantial portion of a country’s gross domestic
product (at least 45 per cent in Canada),104 and, by some estimates, much of its
environmental pollution (around 70 per cent in the UK).105 A majority of
SMEs are micro-enterprises, typically defined in Canada as legally constituted
employer enterprises with fewer than five people.106 Small business represents
the foundation of a national economy and has a profound impact on prosperity
and environmental health. Without a successful and environmentally responsible
small business sector, no economy can evolve to become sustainable.

100. Neil Gunningham, “Regulating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises” (2002) 14 J. Envtl. L. 3.
101. Industry Canada, supra note 7 at 7.
102. Ibid. at 6.
103. Ibid. at 7.
104. Doug Bruce, SME Succession: Update (Toronto: Canadian Federation of Independent
Business, 2006).
105. Gunningham, supra note 100.
106. Industry Canada, supra note 7 at 5.
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The vast majority of environmental regulations in Canada and many other
countries are simply not designed for or applied on a substantial scale to small
business. When it is, small business bears a disproportionate share of the
financial burden of regulation. Annual compliance costs per employee are
approximately five times higher for Canadian micro-enterprises than for
businesses with 100 or more employees.107 When expressed as a percentage of
annual turnover, the disparity is at least tenfold.108
Table 1: Estimated Financial Burden of Regulation on Small and Large Canadian Businesses
Number of
employees109

Annual direct
compliance cost
per employee109

Total annual direct
compliance cost
(Col. A x Col. B)

Annual
Turnover110

1-4

$5,317

$5,317 - $21,260

5-19

$2,844

$14,222 - $54,036

20-49

$1,922

$38,444 - $94,178

50-99

$1,422

$71,100 - $140,778

100+

$1,104

$110,400+

$250,000 $999,999
$1,000,000 $2,499,999
$2,500,000 $4,999,999
$5,000,000 $49,999,999
$50,000,000+

Total annual direct
cost of compliance
as percentage of
annual turnover
(Col. C / Col. D)110
2.13%
1.42% - 2.16%
1.54% - 1.88%
0.28% - 1.42%
≤0.22%

Conventional environmental regulation typically disregards the
organizational and cultural characteristics of small business. The vast majority
of businesses with fewer than fifty employees do not have formalized
management systems at all, but operate informally with heavy reliance on
personal knowledge, memory, and informal interpersonal networks.111 Multi-

107. See Table 1 and accompanying discussion, below.
108. Ibid.
109. For the source of this data, see Laura Jones et al., Rated R: Prosperity Restricted by Red Tape
(Toronto: Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 2005) at viii (Figure 2 – The cost
of regulation: direct compliance costs by size of firm).
110. These are illustrative ranges suggested by the authors. There is no consistent relationship
between number of employees and annual turnover.
111. Lynn Johannson, “The Challenge of Implementing ISO 14001 for Small and Medium Sized
Enterprises” (1997) 7 Envtl. Quality Mgmt. 9 at 12 [Johannson, “Challenge”].
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tasking is pervasive, with one or a few individuals performing roles that would
be divided among multiple people or divisions in large firms. Initiative,
adaptability, and self-reliance are at a premium. Autonomy and independence
are highly valued. Governments and laws tend to be viewed with skepticism.
Small business owners are neither against environmental protection, nor
what they perceive as good environmental regulation. The majority believe in
sustainability.112 SMEs, however, have a number of characteristics that impede
the application of conventional command regulation: resource constraints, high
compliance costs, economic marginality, a lack of environmental expertise, low
public profile, and vast numbers.113 They are less likely than large firms to
establish constructive, ongoing relationships with environmental licensing and
inspection officials, or to engage in lobbying of policy makers. They operate on
ultra slim margins. Command regulation, with its emphasis on prohibition,
detailed technical prescriptions, and quasi-criminal enforcement, tends to
aggravate the antagonism toward government latent in many small business
owners, leading to greater resistance rather than voluntary compliance.
While recent years have seen increases in transparency and public
participation in environmental law in most industrial democracies, law-making
processes remain largely inaccessible to SMEs and ordinary citizens. This is
even truer of administrative regulations than statutes. In Canada and other
jurisdictions with parliamentary systems of government, the party holding the
most seats in the legislature controls the executive. This leads to a tendency to
enact vague, general, and discretionary environmental statutes that leave most
of the details to be worked out via regulations and administrative decision
making. This has often been accompanied by a tendency to work out the
content of environmental regulation through closed-door negotiations between
governments and major industrial polluters. 114 Governments have made
increasing use of public notice and comment procedures in recent years, but
112. Matthew Armstrong et al., Achieving Eco-Prosperity: SMEs’ Perspectives on the Environment
(Toronto: Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 2007), online:
<http://www.cfib.ca/research/reports/rr3039.pdf>.
113. Gunningham, supra note 100.
114. See e.g. Michael Howlett, “Policy Instruments and Implementation Styles: The Evolution of
Instrument Choice in Canadian Environmental Policy” in Debora L. VanNijnatten &
Robert Boardman, eds., Canadian Environmental Policy: Context and Cases, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 25.
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this is still not as common or robust as one might hope. Key discussions often
still occur in closed-door consultations with big industry players and a small
range of other organized stakeholders. These consultations are confined to those
stakeholders who understand where and when to intervene and have the
necessary resources to do so. Small businesses, even when represented by peak
associations, by and large have neither the time nor the resources to engage in
these processes.
2.

THE SMALL BUSINESS SUCCESSION CRISIS

The problem of environmental regulation of SMEs does not exist in a socioeconomic vacuum. Demographic trends in many countries project an
impending succession crisis in the small business community. This crisis
presents an unprecedented opportunity to help this sector embrace sustainable
business practices. 115 The Canadian small business community, like the
Canadian population as a whole, is aging. A recent survey indicated that 66 per
cent of Canada’s small business owners, representing just under 700,000
businesses, intend to retire over the next ten years.116 Of these, 37 per cent want
to sell their businesses on the open market, 26 per cent want to pass their
businesses to a family member, and 4 per cent intend to wind up their businesses.
A further 26 per cent have no exit vision, while 6 per cent responded “other,”
which may or may not indicate that they have planned their succession.117
The small business succession crisis will have profound impacts on
communities and the tax base. It is also likely to trigger controversy over
protected retirement plans. More importantly for our purposes, the Canadian
small business community is entering a buyer’s market that will continue for
ten to eighteen years. With environmental protection a top priority public
issue, buyers are more likely to place environmental management higher on
their checklists for showing evidence of a well managed company. In this
115. Lynn Johannson, “The Confluence of Small Business, Succession and Sustainability” ISO
Management Systems (March-April 2008) 5.
116. Ibid. at 6; Doug Bruce, “The Context: Turning Risks into Opportunities” in Canadian
Institute of Chartered Accountants, Succession Planning Toolkit for Business Owners (Toronto:
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2006).
117. Doug Bruce & Derek Picard, Succession Can Breed Success: SME Succession and Canada’s
Economic Prosperity (Toronto: Canadian Federation of Independent Business, 2005) at 4,
online: <http://www.cfib.ca/research/reports/rr3007.pdf>.
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atmosphere, the presence of a robust and credible EMS could become a
screening tool for a prospective buyer, or even a deciding factor when other
factors are equal. So why are small businesses not racing to adopt ISO 14001?
There are several well-documented obstacles to SME adoption of EMSs.118
Most small business owners have not even heard of ISO 14001.119 Among
those who have heard of it, the standard is perceived (mistakenly) as something
requiring third party certification by an accredited registrar. The cost of
certification tends to preclude their interest. It typically represents almost 2 per
cent of a small business’s annual turnover, compared to approximately 0.05 per
cent for large businesses. 120 For many small businesses, an expense of this
magnitude can make the difference between profit and loss. The disparity is
even greater when we consider certification cost per employee, which ranges
from $0.21 per employee for large firms to $8,500 per employee for the
smallest micro-enterprises.121 Even if they have the resources, paying for an
EMS audit may not be the best use of their money, given the research on
certification alluded to earlier. On a limited budget, better value may come
from identifying their environmental aspects or conducting a gap analysis to
highlight what they already do well and where they might improve.

118. See e.g. Johannson, “Challenge,” supra note 111; Hillary, supra note 8; and Gunningham,
supra note 100.
119. The Canadian Federation of Independent Business has surveyed its members’ awareness of
ISO 14001 a number of times. Johannson’s firm, E2M, has conducted periodic surveys on
EMS and SMEs since 1994. The results are consistent. The vast majority of small business
owners, like the general public, have either not heard about ISO 14001, or do not recall it.
120. See Table 2 and accompanying discussion, below.
121. Ibid.
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Table 2: Estimated Cost of ISO 9001 or 14001 Registration for Small and Large Businesses122
Organization
size (sales)

Professional
fees for initial
audit

Professional fees
for surveillance
audits

Number of
employees

Total cost per
employee (Cols.
B+C x Col. D)

Small
($500,000)
Medium
($5,000,000)
Large
($50,000,000)

$6,000

$2,500

1-49

$174 - $8,500

$10,000

$5,000

50-99

$150 - $300

$18,000

$7,000

100+

$0.21 - $248

Moreover, as we discussed earlier, certification is only one of four options
for demonstrating conformity to ISO 14001.123 The EMS community needs to
do a better job of communicating the message that a robust and credible EMS
can generate economic, environmental, and social benefits. Conformity
assessment is not the first priority, and organizations may choose which of the
four options best suits their needs. Even if the cost barrier can be overcome,
however, there remain substantial cultural and organizational barriers to ISO
14001 adoption. ISO 14001 is currently marketed by consultants, auditors,
standards bodies, and ISO itself as a formal management system designed by
large firms based on their own experience. By contrast, most small businesses
operate informally. They are unlikely to embrace a formal environmental
management system in the absence of clear incentives, such as customers’
willingness to include the cost of EMS implementation and maintenance in the
prices paid for products and services, or governments’ willingness to subsidize
all or part of such costs. Time is another barrier. It takes time to implement an
EMS. Time is a scarce and non-renewable resource for an SME.
SMEs do not just face barriers at the implementation stage. There are also
serious obstacles to SME participation in environmental standards

122. This table summarizes cost estimates obtained from ISO 9001 and 14001 registrars for a
research project undertaken by Johannson’s firm, E2M, in 1998 [unpublished; results on file
with authors; data reproduced with permission]. The professional fees were separated to
show the relative cost of the initial audit (“Professional fees for initial audit”) versus
surveillance (follow-up) audits (“Professional fees for surveillance audits”). Anecdotal
evidence obtained by the authors suggests that the disparity between registration costs for
small and large businesses observed in 1998 persists today.
123. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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development. The same resource, knowledge, and time constraints that prevent
small business from participating effectively in public policy processes apply to
standards development. Small business participation in TC 207 (the ISO
technical committee responsible for EMS standards) has been woefully
inadequate from the start, and most national mirror committees have fared no
better. TC 207 has struck a series of internal task forces in recent years aimed at
identifying and overcoming obstacles to SME participation. Yet these task
forces have had almost no SME representation. The few small business
associations that have actually attempted to participate in TC 207 have been
ignored, and have felt alienated and frustrated.
Standards development bodies need to develop a much better
understanding of the nature and culture of small business. This will entail
developing ways to market the key elements of ISO 14001 to small business
that will bring SMEs the greatest value and help them move quickly towards
sustainability. Just as full compliance with all theoretically applicable laws is
typically not an entry level environmental management proposition for small
business, full EMS adoption based on the degree of formality found in larger
entities may not be suitable either. While some SMEs may benefit from
increased formality, 124 many standards developers, consultants, and auditors
who market ISO 14001 presume a degree of formality far beyond what is
suitable or realistic for the vast majority of SMEs.
TC 207’s response to this problem has been to initiate work on ISO
14005, a guide for “phased implementation” of ISO 14001.125 If recent drafts
of this guide are any indication, it is unlikely to solve the problem. All the
classic flaws are there. It assumes that SMEs can ingest an excessively formal
management system simply by breaking it into pieces to be swallowed
sequentially. Experience with phased implementation of EMS standards in
Europe suggests that many SMEs will either not complete all stages, or regress
when government subsidies dry up. Phased implementation itself is not the
problem. It takes time for any organization, big or small, to implement a robust

124. See Hillary, supra note 8 at 144.
125. ISO/TC 207/SC 1, ISO/CD 14005.2, Environmental management system – Guide for the
phased implementation of an environmental management system – Including the use of
environmental performance evaluation (Committee Draft 2, 14 February 2008) [copy on file
with authors].
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and credible EMS. However, staged verification may risk diluting the credibility
of ISO 14001 if organizations can stop part way through yet still claim the
reputation-related benefits of ISO 14001 adoption.
The current draft of the phased implementation guide is an unwieldy and
complex document, more than twice the length of ISO 14001. It is far too long
to be of use to any small businesses that want to implement an EMS. If ISO
14005 is published without substantial changes, it will be an embarrassment to
ISO at best, or it will drive an irrevocable wedge between ISO and small
business at worst.
Both governments and standards development bodies have failed to
respond adequately to the characteristics and challenges of small business. EMS
standards and EPs regulations are only small manifestations of this larger
problem. In the concluding section of this article, we speculate about where this
leaves us on the path toward smart regulation and sustainable development.
IV. CONCLUSION

The experience with the incorporation of environmental management systems
into Ontario’s environmental penalties regulations suggests six principles for
incorporating standards into environmental regulation. First, do not reinvent
the wheel. If a standard exists that fulfills the objectives of a proposed
regulation, and the standard was developed by a recognized standards body
through a relatively robust multi-stakeholder consensus process, regulators
should incorporate the standard into the regulatory scheme to the extent
possible and appropriate. Second, strive for consistency. Avoid proliferation of
unexplained discrepancies between the proposed regulation and the standard.
Third, make any extra requirements clear. If an existing, widely accepted
standard does not, on its own, meet all the public policy goals of the proposed
regulation, indicate clearly how the standard is deficient and what more is
required to meet public policy objectives. Fourth, connect with the experts on
the relevant standards development committees. They have been through
almost every argument imaginable in developing the standard and bring a
reservoir of knowledge and experience to the public policy table. Fifth, get
involved in standards development. Where the opportunity exists, participate
directly in the work of relevant standards development committees to keep
abreast of relevant issues and influence the content of standards. If committee
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membership is not an option, take advantage of other forms of involvement.
Finally, consider the needs of small business. Both regulators and standards
development bodies should address the special characteristics and challenges of
the SMEs that make up more than 95 per cent of the business community.
Ignoring them will impair economic, environmental, and social well-being.
The first five suggestions have the potential to advance smart regulation in
modest but significant ways by—among other things—saving government
policy development costs, enlisting non-governmental expertise, enhancing
uniformity of business requirements, taking advantage of market forces, and
enhancing the reflexive capacities of regulated entities. Our sixth suggestion,
however, has truly transformative potential and represents a fundamental
challenge for both regulators and standardization bodies. Designing and
implementing regulatory systems that effectively mobilize small business will be
critical to sustainable development. While debate continues to rage on the
meaning of sustainability and sustainable development, there is little doubt that
they represent the single largest challenge now faced by humankind. The recent
media frenzy related to one issue, climate change, has led to heightened public
awareness and concern. Politicians have put the environment higher on the
policy agenda, but progress has been frustratingly slow.
It is beyond the scope of this article to speculate further on what a
sustainable economy might look like, or what the relationship should be
between smart regulation, small business, and sustainability. What we will say is
that there is a renewed sense of urgency in the air, driven largely by the
challenge of responding to climate change. This urgency will soon be
intensified by a growing number of small business owners wanting to retire.
This succession crisis will not be contained within the Canadian small business
community. Policy-makers and shapers around the world, and at all levels of
government, need to understand the confluence of these issues, and how
pervasive the impacts will be.
It may still be possible to transform this demographic bust into an
environmental boon, but we have a very small window of opportunity. Whether
it is climate change, small business succession, or sustainable development
generally, the window for effective action will close very soon. The next two to
three years are probably the most critical, putting the challenge well within the
planning horizons of today’s politicians and investors. The magnitude of the
challenge should not be underestimated, but the time for action has arrived.
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GLOSSARY

AP
CAC
CSA
EMAS
EMS
ENGO
EP
ISO
P2
POP
SC 1
SCC
SME
TC 207

Administrative Penalty
Canadian Advisory Committee
Canadian Standards Association
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (European Union)
Environmental Management System
Environmental Non-Governmental Organization
Environmental Penalty
International Organization for Standardization
Pollution Prevention
Prevention of Pollution
Subcommittee 1 (Environmental Management Systems) of
TC 207
Standards Council of Canada
Small or Medium-sized Enterprise
ISO Technical Committee 207 (Environmental
Management)

